


DIA HISTORY OFFICE

July 1997

A Chronology of Defense Intelligence in the Gulf War: A Research Aid for Analysts



Defense Intelligence Agency



**A Chronology of Defense Intelligence
in the Gulf War:
A Research Aid for Analysts**

**BY
BRIAN SHELLUM
1997**

**DIA History Office
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20340**

FOREWORD

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM provided a significant challenge to the Defense Intelligence Agency and to the Defense Intelligence Community. During the early stages of DESERT SHIELD, the United States and our allies faced a significant threat with only limited infrastructure and minimal command, control, communications, and intelligence assets in the region. During DESERT STORM, Coalition forces swiftly liberated Kuwait and defeated the fifth largest army in the world without suffering significant losses.

The United States and our allies benefitted tremendously from superior national and theater intelligence during the war. Intelligence was recognized as a significant force multiplier and contributed directly to the Coalition victory and the speed with which it was achieved. In the words of General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "No combat commander has ever had as full and complete view of the adversary as did our field commander. Intelligence support to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was a success story."


We continue to strive for better intelligence support to operational commanders and national consumers. Starting before the end of DESERT STORM, DIA conducted a thorough examination of our performance in all aspects of intelligence support. Working closely with the Defense Intelligence Community, the Military Intelligence Board, and US Central Command, DIA compiled a comprehensive list of lessons learned. In the six years since the end of the war, we have incorporated those lessons into plans, programs, products, organizations, and joint intelligence doctrine.

The US Intelligence Community has directly benefitted from many of the improvements in crisis intelligence support made by Rear Admiral James M. McConnell (J-2 during the war) and many other intelligence professionals as a result of lessons learned from the Gulf War. Our intelligence support of US, UN, and allied forces during numerous crises in the past few years has greatly improved as a result. The Intelligence Community activated Intelligence Task Forces, deployed National Intelligence Support Teams, and synchronized intelligence support for US and multi-national forces in Haiti and Bosnia.

As new generations of intelligence officers face what undoubtedly will be formidable future challenges with fewer available resources, the critical contributions of the US and allied Military Intelligence Community during the Gulf War must not be forgotten. In a fast-paced world beset with trial and uncertainty, we are often forced to react with little time to study and adapt what we have learned. We need to apply what we learned in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. It is imperative, therefore, that we docu-

ment our accomplishments while the events are fresh in our minds and the records are still in our possession.

I fully support historical documents of this kind that record the critical role of Military Intelligence in a dangerous and rapidly changing world. This extensive chronology, the first of several unclassified publications, is a guide to day-to-day support provided to the warfighter. It is for soldiers and strategists, policymakers and scholars, but most importantly, the practitioners of intelligence — our Nation's first line of defense.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Patrick Hughes', with a stylized, flowing script.

Patrick Hughes
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, DIA

PREFACE In 1994, the DIA Director instructed the DIA History Office to begin writing historical products not only for the DIA user, but also for consumers outside of the Agency. Beginning in 1997, therefore, many historical publications, some short and others book-length, will become available at the classified and unclassified levels in support of the DIA mission. They will serve the dual purpose of documenting historical events and informing the non-DIA reader of the significance of the Agency's contributions to our country's national security.

The Agency has established, as one of the highest priorities in completing these publications, a comprehensive history of DIA's role in supporting DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The task of preparing this history involved researching over a million pages of documentation and other primary source material. In addition, it required conducting many interviews with people who were key to the effort as well as seeking additional documentation. DIA plans to publish this book-length illustrated narrative, in classified and unclassified versions in 1997.

This chronology is one of the by-products of the history and it will be included in the final publication. Pictures, drawings, charts, and maps have been added to make it more meaningful. I have also appended a DIA organizational chart and glossary to sort the unavoidable acronyms and abbreviations. This work is meant to be a chronology of Defense Intelligence support to DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, not a detailed description of those events.

As with each of the forthcoming publications, this chronology strives to meet the needs of the planner, analyst, researcher, student, and manager. With these primary users in mind, its purpose is to learn and set forth the lessons that are important to intelligence, and particularly the Defense Intelligence Agency as a Combat Support Agency. To insure a comprehensive, balanced, and accurate treatise, I solicited the assistance of individuals and source materials both inside and outside the Agency.

I completed this chronology in a six-month period while researching and writing the first five chapters of the forthcoming book. This effort would not have been possible without the help and guidance of a number of people. First and foremost on that list is Deane Allen, the DIA Historian, who first conceived this project in August 1990. He assisted and advised me throughout the early stages of my research and writing, and deserves a great deal of the credit. Over the past six years he saved many of the critical documents and records that were vital to this undertaking.

A number of other people have been especially generous in agreeing to interviews and taking the time to comment on my early drafts. These include Roy Apseloff, Jim Claxton, Mel Geiger, John Moore, Dr. William Mussen, COL James Ritchey and Ed Valentine. In my own office, I have benefitted greatly from the advice of Curtis Utz and the assistance of Mirlin Toomer. This publication would not have been possible without the hard work and patience of Andrea Flowers, Monique Evans, and Barbara Smith in the Office for Publications. I would also be remiss in not mentioning the valuable support of MG John A. Leide, John T. Berbrich, John J. Sloan, James W. Lucas, Hans Pawlisch, LTC Steve E. Dietrich, and Don Lenker. Special thanks go to BG David A. Armstrong in the JCS History Office for his support of this project.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Brian G. Shellum". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, sweeping initial "B" and a long, horizontal flourish at the end.

Brian G. Shellum
Deputy DIA Historian

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword	iii
Preface	v
Chronology of Events	1
Prewar	1
DESERT SHIELD	14
DESERT STORM	32
Postwar	38
Maps	41-42
DIA Organizational Chart	43
DIA Organizations	44
Glossary	46

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

PREWAR

- 1984 THE Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) sends a team to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) to study its intelligence support requirements and the feasibility of attaching a DIA intelligence production element to CENTCOM headquarters.
- 1985 DIA becomes one of the first national agencies to assign a permanent representative at CENTCOM. Also, an eleven-man DIA intelligence production element is attached to CENTCOM headquarters.
- DIA opens a US Defense Attache Office (USDAO) in Baghdad to expand access to developments in Iraq and obtain information on the Iran-Iraq War.
- 1987 The Defense Attache (DATT) in Baghdad gains unprecedented access to senior Iraqi military leaders in the wake of the attack on the USS STARK and sets up procedures to deconflict Iraqi and US operations in the Gulf.
- DIA establishes the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) to enhance its capability to respond to crisis situations. DIA designed the OICC to muster resources quickly to surge on a problem and then convert analysis to operationally relevant products and support.

USS STARK burns after being hit by Iraqi missiles in 1987.



DIA augments the Persian Gulf Working Group (PGWG) in the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) at the Pentagon with additional personnel to track on a 24-hour basis the tanker war, the Iran-Iraq ground war, the air threat, the SILKWORM threat, and other developments.

DIA initiates the National Military Intelligence support Team (NMIST) concept to augment intelligence support to commands during crisis operations. NMISTs are mobile support teams deployed to commands to provide analytical support and rapid dissemination of time-sensitive intelligence information and products.

DIA's all-source threat assessments provide critical intelligence for the US retaliatory strikes against the Iranian owned and occupied Rashadat oil platform.

1988

DIA intelligence support to US forces and allies in the Persian Gulf intensifies as the Iran-Iraq War expands in a renewed "War of the Cities" and spills into the Gulf. DIA provides operational elements predeployment briefings and support for retaliatory strikes against Iran.

Iraqi ground forces launch a series of five crushing offensive operations catching the Iranians ill-prepared and destroying their will to fight.



President Bush receives a briefing from DIA in the NMIC during Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) in 1989. Panama was the first major operational test of the NMIST concept. NMISTs were used extensively and with great success during the Gulf War.

Iran accepts United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 598, leading to the 20 August cease-fire that ends the bloody eight-year war with Iraq.

DIA upgrades and renovates the NMIC as an integrated, state-of-the-art intelligence facility. NMIC components include the Alert Center, Collection Coordination Facility, and intelligence tasks forces areas.

1989

April

CENTCOM assesses that Iraq will be the next likely regional threat in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War and the decline of the Soviet threat.

August

DIA military capability analysts disseminate Iraqi invasion of Kuwait scenario to CENTCOM and other commands. CENTCOM concurs with analysis by late 1989. It becomes the scenario for CENTCOM's Command Post Exercise (CPX) INTERNAL LOOK, in July 1990.

November

A Defense Intelligence Brief (DIB), *The Iraqi Threat to the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) States*, presents an assessment of Iraqi military capabilities and options to take military action against Kuwait, without dealing with the likelihood of such actions.

A Defense Intelligence Assessment, *Iraqi Military Developments Through 1992*, asserts: "Iraq is unlikely to launch military operations against any of its Arab neighbors over the next three years with the possible exception of Syria....To protect its image of moderation, Iraq is unlikely to take military action against Kuwait."

1990

February

DIA publishes an Intelligence Study, *Iraqi Ground and Air Forces Doctrine, Tactics, and Operations*, based on Iraqi Army and Air Force performance during the Iran-Iraq War.

DIA analysts participate in a war game of Iraqi invasion of the Arabian Peninsula organized by the Naval War College (NWC) Strategic Studies Group.

24 April

CENTCOM establishes Iraq Regional Warning Problem and assumes Watch Condition (WATCHCON) Level IV (defined as "potential threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces), and thereby increasing the intelligence collection priority against Iraq. (WATCHCON is an expression of intelligence interest and concern relative to the potential threat outlined in a Warning Problem. A Warning Problem for a country or region is a set of detectable events that might lead to a threat or crisis.)

NOTE: When a specific date is not known, a monthly entry will be indicated.

-
- April JSW (Directorate for Indications and Warning) adds Iraq as a "regional threat" to the Indications and Warning (I&W) System based on concerns voiced by CENTCOM and DIA. DIA and US Commands formally begin monitoring Iraqi activities for indications of war preparations.
- May DIA participates in CENTCOM's war game of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
- 11 June CENTCOM issues first status change to Warning Problem. (A status change to a Problem is made whenever detectable events arise which change the likelihood that the threat might ensue.)
- July DIA analysts participate in a three-week-long NWC war game of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The war game mirrors reality as crisis approaches in Iraq and Kuwait.



Saddam Hussein

- 17 July Saddam Hussein delivers a strongly worded speech condemning Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) oil policies.

Intelligence Community receives first unconfirmed reports of a troop buildup in southern Iraq.

Kuwait deploys forces to defend Kuwait City and puts armed forces on full alert in response to Iraqi threats.

18 July


CENTCOM issues a Worldwide Warning and Indicator Monitoring System (WWIMS) status change to the DoD intelligence warning community and its subordinate commands concerning the Iraqi propaganda and diplomatic campaign against Kuwait.

DIA receives a request from CENTCOM for additional imagery coverage of Iraq and Kuwait after an Iraqi démarche to Kuwait.

19 July

DIA receives first reports of movement of two Iraqi divisions to deployment areas near the Kuwaiti border.

Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO) for Middle East, South Asia, and Terrorism (MESAT) sends a message to the DIA Director stating that the Iraqi activity near the Kuwaiti border is "not a rehearsal." This message is forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).



Iraqi claimed the disputed Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah.

DI-6 (Foreign Exchanges and Disclosures Division) grants authorization for CENTCOM to release data on Iraq to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

20 July A Defense Intelligence Digest (DID) article speculates that, "Iraq is unlikely to use significant force against Kuwait, such as the occupation of Warbah and Bubiyan Islands.... Small-scale incursions are possible."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) requests DIA develop a list of targets in Iraq. OICC, located at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC), Bolling AFB, initiates targeting support for CENTCOM.

DIA analysts detect the movement of artillery and tank battalions in southeastern Iraq, 30 miles north of the Kuwaiti border. Some are loaded on heavy equipment transports (HETs).

20-28 July CENTCOM conducts CPX INTERNAL LOOK 90 to examine new Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1002, *Defense of the Arabian Peninsula*, to validate operational and logistical support concepts.

21 July DC-1 (Current Operations Division, Directorate for Collection) reports that Iraqi forces are moving closer to the border. Elements of two additional armored divisions join the original Iraqi armored brigade, but there are no logistics support units with these forces.

CENTCOM and DIA raise WATCHCON in Level III (defined as "increased threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces).

22 July DIA receives reports of more than 3000 military vehicles moving south on the road from Baghdad toward Kuwait and 27 free rocket over ground (FROG) transporter erector launchers (TELs) being loaded onto railroad cars.

DC-1 reports 20 FROG rocket airframes being loaded onto trucks for transport. DIA analysts report a total of 305 T-72 tanks, 167 BMP armored personnel carriers, and 198 artillery pieces present in assembly areas north of the Kuwaiti border.

DIA activates the Iraq/Kuwait Regional Working Group (IZKRWG) at the Pentagon. (A working group is activated by DIA whenever additional manpower is needed to cover a developing crisis in a region of the world).

23 July Kuwait deploys forces to the border area while the UAE increases its combat air patrols.

DC-1 reports that more artillery and the first surface-to-air missile unit, an SA-9 battery, have deployed to the border. DC-1 also reports a logistics site is being established near the border.

DC-1 produces the first of many collection posture statements (CPS) on the Iraq-Kuwait crisis.

23-24 July VP (Directorate for Foreign Intelligence) and DX (Directorate for Imagery Exploitation) analysts hold videolink meetings with JSJ (Directorate for JCS Intelligence Support) and JCS J-3 (Operations Directorate) to discuss targets.

24 July KC-135 aircraft deploy to the UAE for Exercise IVORY JUSTICE which was a demonstration of US concern and support.

CENTCOM raises WATCHCON to Level II (defined as "significant threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces).


DIA issues WWIMS Warning Report to policy officials and the Intelligence Community assessing Iraq to have enough military force in place to achieve its goals regarding Kuwait.

25 July A meeting called by OPEC opens to address the Iraqi claims of continued Kuwaiti over-quota oil production and to defuse the mounting crisis at the Iraq/Kuwait border area.

Defense Special Assessment (DSA) states: "Iraq is using rhetoric, diplomatic pressure, and significant military posturing to force Kuwait to comply with recent oil and economic demands. Although unlikely to use military pressure, Iraq is marshaling forces sufficient to invade Kuwait. With forces currently in place, Iraq would be able to overwhelm Kuwaiti forces and likely occupy its limited objectives within 48 hours, or most of Kuwait in 5 days."

DIA goes to WATCHCON II and issues WWIMS Warning Report stating Iraqi military forces fully capable of military actions against Kuwait.

DI-6 asks the Secretary of Defense for permission to begin providing information on Iraq to Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar.



Iraqi Republican Guard Forces on the Kuwaiti border, 1 August 1990.

DI-3 (Legislative Affairs Division) arranges a briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on the Gulf crisis. When asked by senior members of the SSCI about indicators of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a DIA analyst replies that the indicators have already been seen.

■ July

Kuwait adopts a partial stand down of its infantry and armor units as tensions diminish because of growing confidence in successful OPEC negotiations. Saudi Arabia states it will not tolerate an Iraqi takeover of Kuwait.

27 July

DID reports the tensions between Baghdad and Kuwait are subsiding, though military forces remain deployed. Report speculates that Kuwait will give Saddam most of what he wants to avoid military confrontation.

DIA receives reports that the logistics train to support the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) is moving south toward the Kuwaiti border.

Both DIA and CENTCOM have intelligence sources on the ground in Kuwait City who subsequently report first hand on developments there.

DIO for MESAT and analysts from DB-8 (Middle East/Africa Division, Directorate for Research) meet with the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the US ■ the Pentagon and tell him unequivocally that Iraq is going to invade Kuwait.

29 July OICC personnel meet with RS (Directorate for Resources) ■ anticipation of crisis support to prioritize resources, including: photo lab, graphics, distribution, library, and print shop support.

30 July DID states that, "Saddam will probably maintain Iraq's military stance until Kuwait agrees to his demands. Some military action is likely if Kuwait is resolute."

DIO for MESAT sends E-mail message to the DIA Director warning that Iraq is not "...bluffing."

DIA begins producing operational support packages (OSP) on primary targets and basic target graphics (BTG) on primary and secondary targets in support of CENTCOM Target List.

CENTCOM sends DIA a request for additional imagery coverage on Iraq.

30-31 July OICC recalls 17 VP analysts ■ work through the night ■ support a Commander in Chief, CENTCOM (CINCCENT) target briefing to the JCS.

31 July CINCCENT briefs CJCS and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) on deployment options.

DSA states "Unless Kuwait's negotiators can offer a sufficiently attractive package of economic aid, reparations, or grants, ...Baghdad may consider taking what the Kuwaitis are unwilling to offer at the negotiating table.

DIO for MESAT sends a message to DIA Director and Deputy Director for JCS Support (JS) warning that Saddam is not bluffing and that his force is sufficient to conquer both Kuwait and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.

The OPEC meeting ends ■ failure and the participants returned home. The situation remains unsolved but tensions seem to be at a lower level.

1 August DIA analysts confirm the movement to forward assembly areas of artillery units required for offensive operations.



Iraqi assault operations, 2 August 1990, showing the main attack in the center, a supporting attack in the west, and an airmobile assault in the east.



Iraqi troops in Kuwait celebrate their victory.

CENTCOM and DIA go ■ WATCHCON I (defined as a "clear and immediate threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces). This is the first time a command or agency goes to WATCHCON I ■ advance of a conflict.

CENTCOM and DIA issue WWIMS Warning Reports that an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait ■ imminent.

DIA establishes Iraqi Regional Intelligence Task Force (ITF) by expanding the IZKUWG. The expanded Task Force moves into the ITF spaces ■ the NMIC at the Pentagon.

2 August

Iraqi forces invade Kuwait and drive ■ the Kuwaiti/Saudi Arabia border area.

CINCCENT presents military options to President Bush and the National Security Council (NSC).



General Schwarzkopf, Secretary Cheney, President Bush, and General Powell.

CJCS issues a Warning Order alerting military units to prepare to deploy.

CENTCOM begins to develop courses of action and examine alternative force levels to respond to the crisis.

OICC establishes extended manning in response to the activation of the ITF. The OICC provides specialized targeting products, detailed and in-depth analysis, battle damage assessments for CENTCOM, ground order of battle (OB) information, special studies, and strategic estimates.

DAT-6 (Middle East/Africa Division) begins 24-hour operations ■ Clarendon, tasking worldwide collection.

DAT-6 Country Officer is detailed to the J-5 (JCS Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy) Iraq Strategic Studies Group, the organization that ■ ■ draft a national policy response for senior leaders.

DI-1 (Director's Staff Group Division) starts Monday and Thursday briefings to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) principals and staff.

DC compiles a list of targets in Iraq to monitor chemical warfare (CW) sites and Iraqi reinforcements.

OSC-5 (Security Programs Division) briefs JS representatives at NMIC on Iraqi intelligence services.

FBI reinforces the DIA terrorism watch with an FBI agent.

2-11 August DC-1 briefs DIA Director twice on imagery intelligence (IMINT) system options. Also briefed is the National Security Advisor's Chief of Staff.

3 August J-5 Iraq Strategic Studies Group, with DIA representation, forwards draft strategy paper to the CJCS. He passes it to the Secretary of Defense, who delivers it to the President. The four goals set out in this paper are identical to the four objectives mentioned by the President in his 5 and 8 August policy speeches.

ITF spaces expand. VP analysts augment ITF. The ITF serves mainly as an administrative clearing house for taskings and provides numerous high-level briefings.

DX-6 (Current Imagery Division) requests coverage of Scud missile sites.

DI-3 coordinates briefing for the Defense Subcommittee and staff of the House Appropriations Committee.

4 August The President and the NSC hear CINCCENT and Air Force Component, Central Command (CENTAF) briefings at Camp David on military options.

DM-1 (Plans, Programs, and Policy Division, Directorate for Imagery Management) receives first National Military Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) cable from CENTAF.

DI-3 coordinates briefing on the Gulf crisis for 67 senators.

5 August President Bush states that Iraqi aggression "shall not stand" and frames US national policy objectives:

- Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
- Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
- Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and
- Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.

The USS INDEPENDENCE, in the North Arabian Sea, is within range to launch air strikes against Iraqi forces, if necessary.

OICC provides VP augmentees in form NMISTs.

DX-5 (Regional Analysis Division, Directorate for Imagery Exploitation) initiates production of an Iraqi ground forces overlay and report, providing an overview of the disposition of Iraqi forces located in southern Iraq and Kuwait.



6 August

UN Resolution 661 calls for restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and for an embargo on Iraq.

SECDEF, CINCCENT, and other CENTCOM officials travel to Jiddah, Saudi Arabia to seek King Fahd's agreement to deploy US forces. The King grants permission for the operation.

DAH (Operations Division, Directorate of Attaches and Operations) begins providing daily DESERT SHIELD DoD human intelligence (HUMINT) collection posture and situation updates to DIA leadership.


DIA maintains daily telephonic contact with ■ source in Kuwait City. This source details the Iraqi consolidation of the city and ongoing military operations.

DI-4 (Foreign Liaison Division) begins daily intelligence summary (INTSUM) distribution and briefings to selected foreign attaches.

DESERT SHIELD

7 August Operation DESERT SHIELD begins (C-Day). The President orders the deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia.


CJCS issues deployment orders for initial units ■ Southwest Asia.



Iraqi disposition ■ forces ■ Kuwait on 6 August 1990. Regular army divisions were arriving from garrisons in Iraq, freeing RGFC units for further employment.

ITF assumes a 24-hour, 7-day week analytical and support status.

NMIST personnel and equipment deploy with CENTAF to Riyadh.



SH-60 Seahawk helicopter approaches a tanker in the Persian Gulf.

Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC)/DC-1 confirms that the 3 RC-135's currently at Athens will deploy to Saudi Arabia once permission is granted.

DC-1 requests that the Air Force Staff project costs for the SR-71 reactivation.

7-10 August DSD-3 (General Military Intelligence Support Division) develops the procedure for including the general military intelligence (GMI) air, ground, and naval order of battle daily updates into the Automated Installation Intelligence File (AIF).

8 August President announces US deployments to "defensive positions" and reiterates four policy objectives.

First fighter aircraft of the USAF 1st Tactical Fighter Wing arrives in Saudi Arabia.

CINCCENT recommends ■ the JCS that operations be called PENINSULA SHIELD. That name is rejected in favor of DESERT SHIELD, recommended by the CINC's staff.

NMISTs deploy to XVIII Airborne Corps, US Marine Central Command (MARCENT), and US Navy Central Command (NAVCENT).

DIA receives a CENTCOM request for information on Iraqi reaction to arrival of XVIII Airborne Corps troops ■ Saudi Arabia.

9 August UN Security Council condemns Iraq's annexation of Kuwait as illegal, null, and void.

CENTCOM headquarters advanced party arrives in Riyadh.

Lead Army elements of the 82nd Airborne Division arrive in Saudi Arabia.

DI-6 grants authority to release OLYMPIC FLARE imagery to Coalition Forces (military forces contributed by countries allied against Iraq).

10 August DIA issues HUMINT tasking ■ provide the location and description of key Iraqi government facilities.

DC receives request from Navy for coverage of the port of Umm Qasr to monitor Iraq's mining operations.

12 August DIA issues worldwide HUMINT tasking to begin tracking merchant ships to monitor support of the UN embargo against Iraq.

13 August DI-6 completes guidance for intelligence sharing with Coalition Forces.

15 August DIA sends team to CENTCOM (Hear) at McDill AFB to discuss foreign disclosure, development of an all-source fusion center, production coordination, and targeting/operational issues.

DAT-6 provides personnel for HUMINT representation on the ITF.

DAH begins providing daily DoD HUMINT collection activity summary to ITF/CCF (Collection Coordination Facility).

OSC-2 (Physical/Tempest Security Division, Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence) provides security recommendations for the multinational environment of the CENTCOM Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).

DX-5 begins production of OSP's on the top 43 primary targets on CENTCOM's target list.

DX-6 expands its reporting in both the Significant Imagery Highlights Book and daily briefings to the JS, to include the status of Iraqi shipping after enactment of the UN embargo.

16 August DoD designates DIA as Executive Agent for DESERT SHIELD imagery collection.

The Clarendon Operations Support Center begins a 24-hour watch.

DM-1 consolidates instructions for use and distribution of NARROW SANDS F-14 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) information.

17 August DAT-6 receives information indicating Iraq plans to use Western "detainees" as human shields.

DIA begins publication of the Military Situation Summary (MSS) at the OICC.

DIA begins analysis of Iran/Iraq POW history, ■ include POW camp locations, treatment of POW's, and procedures.


DIA Director orders that all Scud sites be placed ■ active collection.

DC reports that a CCF Imagery Officer ■ required at the following daily meetings:

0400 - Teleconference room with the OICC (to accept proposed targets for the next day)

0600 - JS update

**SCUD/AL HUSAYN
TRANSPORTER ERECTOR LAUNCHER (TEL)**



Drawing of the Iraqi version of the Scud missile prepared by DIA Public Affairs (DI-PA) for public and media release.

0730 - DC morning brief

1145 - JS (for JS's emphasis requirements)

1400 - DIA discussion on requirements

1500 - Community imagery meeting

1730 - Task Force evening wrap-up meeting

2000 - OICC

19 August

NMIST deploys to UK Strike Command in High Wycombe, UK.

DIA publishes first DESERT SHIELD Bulletin.

20 August

DIA orders the establishment of a Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Center (DoDJIC) at the Pentagon at the request of the CJCS to fuse the efforts of DIA and the Military Services.



General Schwarzkopf reviewing Coalition units.

DIA Deputy Director asks DR-BT to develop and maintain a brief on DIA intelligence support to DESERT SHIELD.

DM-1 makes initial distribution of OLYMPIC FLARE airborne imagery highlights.

OICC meets with RS to establish prioritization of RS support to DESERT SHIELD activities (photo lab, graphics, distribution, library, and print shop).

DAT-6 attends tri-service collection manager meeting to discuss DoD/CENTCOM HUMINT tasking in support of DESERT SHIELD. A worldwide HUMINT tasking update message is dispatched as ■ result.

21 August

DIA lifts ban on release of chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) data. This ■ done so DIA can provide CW/BW information ■ CENTCOM which can then pass it on to the Coalition Forces.

22 August

DIA Representative to CENTCOM deploys with the headquarters element to Riyadh, one of only two civilians that General Schwarzkopf allows to deploy permanently forward with him.


DI-6 requests amended release authority to Coalition Forces (granted 19 Sep).

23 August

DIA forms provisional DoDJIC with three teams of Agency personnel. (The DoDJIC produced daily situation summaries and assessments as well as short suspense reporting and analysis. It also had several special production elements added during the course of its existence). DoDJIC operates with 299 personnel at its peak.

DI-6 grants approval for British, Canadian, and Australian officers to work in the OICC.

DIA initiates action to obtain access to Iraqi defectors in Saudi Arabia.



24 August DC receives State Department request for imagery of the Jordanian/Iraqi border to gauge refugee congestion (for embassy evacuation convoy route planning).

25 August DIA forwards draft concept of operations (CONOPS) for Defense Intelligence support to CENTCOM.

DIA participates in wargaming of US options against Iraq. Results lead to major changes to CENTCOM warplan.

VP arranges for three Multimedia Information Network Exchange (MINX) terminals to be installed in the OICC for connectivity to ITF.

26 August DC assigns priority to locating Iraqi Republican Guard units.

	DC-1 prepares a background paper on reactivation of SR-71.
28 August	DC assigns high priority collection to monitor Republican Guard and UN embargo enforcement.
29 August	DS (Directorate for Information Systems) provides proposal to CENTCOM and CENTCOM (Rear) through the DIA Representative for DIA intelligence automation communications support for DESERT SHIELD.
	DIA assumes management responsibility for target material (TM) production.
	DAT-6 sends collection guidance message worldwide to reinforce the need to report any attempts to circumvent the quarantine against Iraq.
30 August	Military Services commit to the DoDJIC. The mission of the DoDJIC is to provide short suspense intelligence tailored to both theater and Washington consumers.
	DSD-3 begins daily update processing of air order of battle (AOB), ground order of battle (GOB), naval order of battle (NOB), and AIF information into the Integrated Data Base (IDB).
	DIA Deputy Director tasks DIA Historian with writing a history of Defense Intelligence support to DESERT SHIELD. Historian begins collecting documents and identifies requirement to key DIA officials.
31 August	OICC ships first of 14 OSPs to CENTCOM.
	ITF modifies manning structure to four teams working 12-hour shifts, seven days a week.
	DIA delivers first escape and evasion (E&E) study to CENTCOM.
	DAT-6 tasks HUMINT sources to report Kuwaiti resistance efforts.
August-September	Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) provides six air defense analysts to DIA/OICC to assist in providing 24-hour intelligence support on Iraqi air defense operations.

Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) provides three chemical warfare analysts to assist DIA's CW/BW analytical cell at the OICC.

1-30 September DI-6 sends sanitized Defense Intelligence Memoranda (DIM) and orders of battle to CENTCOM.

1 September DIA asset obtains an Iraqi sea mine and arranges to have it flown to the US for exploitation.

2 September DoDJIC becomes fully operational with DIA and Service (Army and Navy) manning.

VP establishes Order of Battle Scrub Team in Building 213, Washington Navy Yard.

5 September JS directs DX-6 and DX-7 (Systems, Technology, and Resources Division, Directorate for Imagery Exploitation) to develop a Scud strategy.

DX and DB (Directorate for Research) begin work on a scrub of the AIF in an effort to ensure the accuracy of the warfighting data base.

6 September Air Force adds manning to DoDJIC.

7 September DoDJIC produces first (published twice daily) Defense Special Assessment (DSA).



General Schwarzkopf with a Saudi official during DESERT SHIELD.

8 September DIA sends Assistant DFO for Middle East/South Asia to Riyadh to serve as CINCCENT interpreter.

9 September DX assigns 11 imagery analysts ■ the DoDJIC and transfers production of map overlay responsibility for Iraqi forces south of 31 degrees latitude. DX-5 then initiates production of overlay reporting on Iraqi forces north of 31 degrees.

10 September NMIST deploys to United States European Command (EUCOM).

DoDJIC produces first daily MSS after responsibility is transferred from OICC.

DM-1 consolidates instructions for use and distribution of EAGER LIGHT imagery information.

DSO (Directorate for Systems Operations) installs Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System (AIRES) in the DoDJIC.

10-13 September DS Automation Task Force (ATF) visits CENTCOM, US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), US Tactical Air Command (TAC), US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM).

11 September DIA initiates a 24-hour border watch to report sanctions violations of goods moving into Iraq.

14 September CENTCOM requests that DIA readout DESERT SHIELD Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) imagery.


15 September Initially situated in the CCF, DIA collection management element relocates to the DoDJIC.

Collection and imagery representatives begin 24-hour duty in OICC management cell.

17 September NMIST deploys to CENTCOM.

18 September DS ATF briefs DIA-CS (Directorate for Command Support and Plans) on recommendations/findings from 10-13 September visit to CENTCOM.

20 September DS begins to look at actions required to pass data base information between DIA and CENTCOM. Specific requirement is to pass daily Iraqi OB information to CENTCOM in a timely manner.



The USS WISCONSIN deployed to the Gulf and provided naval gunfire support during the Gulf War.

First reservist reports for duty ■ VP.

21 September DX delivers first gridded reference graphics (GRG) ■ CENTCOM.

25 September CENTCOM requests the CCF pass any "hot" news directly via secure phone to keep them "in the loop." CENTCOM ■ currently eight days behind Washington, DC in imagery reporting.

DIA and the Defense Courier Service (DCS) establish the "Desert Line" courier system ■ expedite OSP and TM delivery to CENTCOM and its warfighting components.

26 September DI-4 arranges for Kuwaiti officials' visit to DIA.

27 September Last of USDAO Baghdad personnel evacuate with other members of the US Embassy staff.



**Iraqi Disposition of Forces
as of 23 October 1990.**

30 September DoDJIC I&W Cell, established in early September, operates around the clock with five analysts.

CENTCOM J2 (CENTCOM Chief of Intelligence) agrees with a DIA recommendation to reduce coverage of Scud sites.

September DX begins work on three dimensional models and a Hostage Intelligence Support Package (HISP) covering some thirty locations in Iraq.

DX-5 begins providing daily imagery derived reports on targets identified as possible American citizen detention areas.

DX begins to develop BDA concept operations, having been charged with the responsibility for all phases of imagery exploitation in support of BDA.

	DX develops ■ BDA workbook containing gridded target graphics, maps, and reporting EEI's on some 309 primary and secondary targets.
	DX establishes Central Tasking Cell (CTC) in the Pentagon to facilitate tasking coordination with the ITF and DoDJIC.
September - January 1991	DIA BDA elements and CENTCOM/CENTAF conduct 18 BDA exercises ■ an effort to ensure the efficiency and accuracy of BDA reporting and dissemination.
2 October	DAT-6 levies further taskings to acquire specific details, as a result of earlier reporting, describing the Iraqi rigging of the Kuwaiti ■ fields for demolition.
	DC begins acquiring baseline imagery coverage for BDA targets.
	DIA sets into motion an imagery "blitz" to determine ground order of battle.
3 October	DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide ■ provide comprehensive Iraqi OB information for the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO — See maps on pages 41 and 42).
■ October	DIA implements crisis local area network (LAN), providing connectivity between all VP Task Force cells.
10 October	DSD-3 prepares an IDB-II crisis data base (Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen) for the OICC to support ad hoc queries and printing reports. IDB-II replaces older IDB-I data base.
13 October	CCF IMINT desk conducts BDA exercise.
18 October	DS ATF chairs meeting with CENTCOM representatives to discuss BDA support, DODIIS (DoD Intelligence Information System), IDB-II support, and CENTCOM requirements.
	DAT-6 sends tasking to regional assets requesting information on the type of warheads for the CCS-2 missile.
20 October	OICC begins to transfer priority intelligence information electronically (via e-mail) to CENTCOM.
	CENTCOM puts imagery blitz on hold until further evaluation by CENTCOM J2.

21 October	CENTCOM approves and begins imagery blitz.
22 October	DIA Director begins to host Military Intelligence Board (MIB) weekly meetings.
24 October	JS informs CCF that the SECDEF wants coverage of the 28 Scud short range ballistic missile (SRBM) launchers at least every other day.
■ October	DSO-1 installs AIRE TELNET (Telecommunications Network) throughout DX offices in Bldg 213, Washington Navy Yard.
30 October	DS ATF demonstrates to ITF the procedures to pass daily/weekly OB messages directly to CENTCOM using e-mail and DSNET3 (Defense Integrated Secure Network 3 — TS/SCI level).
October	DIA sends the former DATT Baghdad to CENTCOM to be Chief of the Combat Analysis Cell after the CENTCOM J2 requests him by name.
	DoDJIC, DX-5, and DX-6 establish imagery analytical expertise focused to monitor and report on all SRBM equipment and activity in Iraq.
	DX-6 initiates daily reporting on Iraqi merchant ship, SRBM, CW and air activities in support of DoDJIC, CENTCOM and JS.
	DX, DB, and JSJ begin meeting with USAF (CHECKMATE) personnel in the Pentagon to facilitate OSP target development and to broaden its insight on BDA.
	DIA sends its Chief of All-Source Collection Requirements Division (DC-4), a Navy captain, to be the CENTCOM JIC collection manager in Riyadh.
	DM-1 formulates plan for Joint Imagery Processing Center (JIPC) concept of photo-processing in Saudi Arabia.
1 November	DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide for information on Iraqi forces in the KTO with emphasis on the RGFC, special forces, Navy, logistics, and equipment.
6 November	ITF sends first of daily and weekly OB update messages via e-mail/DSNET3 to CENTCOM.

7 November

DAT-6 tasks assets to confirm or deny the presence of SS-12/21 missiles in Iraq. Subsequent collection determines they are not present.



President Bush visiting US troop positions in Saudi Arabia during a November 1990 visit.

12 November

DIA sponsored MIB team conducts assessment visit to CENTCOM.

15 November

DIA develops draft concept of operations to integrate the entire Intelligence Community in support of DESERT SHIELD BDA.

DI-6 requests release authority for five more Coalition allies (granted 10 Dec).

22 November

CENTCOM establishes JIC Forward.

25 November

DIA sponsored MIB team releases report on CENTCOM visit.

30 November

DIA establishes DODIIS e-mail link between DIA and CENTCOM.

DC-1 prepares a point paper for the Director, DIA on the diversion of reconnaissance assets from counternarcotics to DESERT SHIELD.

November

DX joins the ad hoc Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Fusion Cell in an effort to assist the DoD/JIC in identifying the Iraqi C3 network in the KTO.



US Air Force F-117 in Saudi Arabia.

JS sends his deputy (an Army colonel) ■ be the CENTCOM JIC Commander, after the CENTCOM J2 requests him by name.

6 December NMIST deploys to US Special Operations Central Command (SOCCENT).

7 December Special DIA ad hoc group meets ■ determine Iraqi BW threat and intelligence gaps.

9-12 December DM-1 team travels to Beale AFB, CA to review progress of deployable photo processing/data base preparations.

10 December DIA establishes BDA Cell to provide third-phase BDA assessment.

DIA and CIA establish Iraqi Interagency Biological Warfare Working Group (IIBWWG).

DC-1 passes tasking to CENTCOM asking them ■ look for SA-2s in southern Kuwait.

Defense Intelligence College (DIC) hosts ■ "Conference on the Gulf Crisis" at the request of VP and the JCS. Analysts working in support of DESERT SHIELD attend the in-depth discussions by experts and academicians.

12 December OSC-CI (Directorate for Counterintelligence) hosts a conference at Clarendon for counterintelligence experts supporting Operation DESERT SHIELD. Twenty-six specialists attend from DIA, CENTCOM, and the Services.

13 December DAT-6 publishes message guidance to collectors on IIR releasability to the Coalition members.

17 December NMIST deploys ■ US Army Central Command (ARCENT).

HIBWWG submits interim report to Deputy Director, DIA.

18 December DM-1 briefs MIB on imagery capabilities.

21 December DAT-6 sends out a worldwide tasking message that provides detailed EEIs and solicits operational information in the event of a terrorist attack.

DX and DB complete AIF scrub after completing the update of approximately 142,000 order of battle and facility transactions.

26 December DIA deploys personnel to CENTCOM JIC in Riyadh. DIA eventually deploys a total of 100 personnel to the JIC Forward.

USDAOs in Yemen and Jordan reduce the size of their staffs because of increased regional tensions. For the same reason, USDAO Khartoum, Sudan later temporarily closes.

28 December OB Scrub Cell from DB and DX completes input of new records, updates AIF, and stands down.

29 December DIA establishes Joint Intelligence Production Center, or "Desert JIPC" in Riyadh. DIA sends an Army colonel from DX to set up and run this organization.

1991

- 2-5 January DIA prepares scenario for Exercise DESERT LIGHTNING.
- 3 January Military Intelligence Detachments (MIDs) arrive at DIA for DESERT SHIELD duty. One hundred thirty-seven reservists are incorporated into the Task Force.
- 5 January DM-1 begins coordination of imagery movement from Riyadh to Washington via DCS, reproduction at DIA, and dissemination to non-theater commands.
- 8 January USDAOs in Bangladesh and Pakistan reduce the size of their staffs at each embassy because of an increase in regional tensions.
- 9 January JIPC integrates UK/CA/AS analysts.
- 10 January NMIST deploys to VII Corps.
- 11 January OICC ships last of 14 Operational Support Packages to CENTCOM.
- DSD-3 prepares IDB-II software and data base for CENTCOM. Daily updates provided via e-mail/DSNET3.
- 12 January American Embassy Baghdad closes as the last six US officials, other Western diplomats, and private citizens depart Iraq for Frankfurt aboard a chartered Iraqi Airlines Boeing 727.
- ITF modifies rotation back to three teams, six days on, three days off, 12-hour shifts.
- 15 January UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait passes.
- DIA augments J2 BDA briefing team with analysts and intelligence technicians.
- DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide to seek host nation reaction to the possible initiation of hostilities by the Coalition forces.
- 16 January DIA establishes a Scud Cell at the DoDJIC in the Pentagon.

DESERT STORM

17 January Operation DESERT STORM begins (D-Day). Coalition air campaign commences.

DIA sends out the first of over 3,200 verbal BDA/I&W reports via the DoDJIC "hot ring" to CENTCOM/CENTAF.


Backing up verbal BDA reports, DX inputs first of over 2,000 ARIES imagery analysis reports and over 222 first and second phase BDA summaries during the course of the war.

DI-6 approves BDA release to UK/CA/AS.

OSC-2 counterintelligence analysts begin I&W watch for terrorist threats to US Forces.

18 January Iraq fires first Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia.

DI-3 coordinates DESERT STORM briefings to the House and Senate.



Aerial refueling of U.S. Navy aircraft by a U.S. Air Force tanker.

BDA 24-hour and 12-hour message initiated.

VP establishes net assessment and BDA teams.

DAT-6 tasks assets for information on Scud strikes against Israel.

DC-1 receives report from CENTCOM JRC that reconnaissance over Western Iraq located 10 Scud launchers. All 10 launchers are reported destroyed.

20 January CENTCOM JIC begins daily production of first-phase BDA reporting via e-mail. OICC downloads reporting and passes to various cells for analysis/comparison.

 DAT-6 tasks assets to acquire BDA data on targets in Kuwait through the use of sources in the Kuwaiti resistance.

21 January DIA establishes a POW/MIA Operations Center to track Coalition POW/MIAs and captured journalists, and to provide information ■ US rescue forces.

 DIA publishes first glossy BDA daily publication.

 DC-1 receives request from JRC Forward to clarify the architecture and connectivity between theater surveillance systems.

22 January DIA expands BDA Cell. ITF I&W Cell displaces Counternarcotics Facility.

 DIA dedicates additional assets to the Scud problem as Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel continue.


23 January DSD produces IDB II five-country data base for CENTCOM.

 DC-1 reports that the President and CJCS have ordered airborne reconnaissance platform JSTARS to perform dedicated reconnaissance on Scud launch areas in western Iraq.

24 January DI-4 arranges weekly briefing for attaches in Washington, DC.

	DAT disseminates guidelines to worldwide collectors on forwarding IIRs and HUMINT operational traffic as a result of JCS-imposed restrictions on routine messages.
25 January	DIA sends requirement through DC-1 to CENTCOM for coverage over western Iraq.
26 January	DIA receives details from the Kuwaiti military resistance on the facilities that control the oil flow to the sea terminals (after Iraq released millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf). Using this information, two F-111 aircraft attack the Al Ahmadi oil manifolds the next day and stop the flow of oil into the Gulf.
27 January	DAT-6 tasks collectors to acquire information on ■ underground facilities in Iraq, plus information on Iran's role in the conflict given the Iraqi air force flights ■ Iran.
28 January	CENTCOM requests an SA-2 OB from DC-1.
29 January	DIA begins baseline MSS production every night.
31 January	DAT-6 tasks regional assets ■ report on the extent of the Persian Gulf oil spill.
1-28 February	DIA elements visit Turkey.
5 February	DC-1 replies ■ CENTCOM request for information about MTI (moving target indicator) and JSTARS.
5-12 February	DSD-3 prepares IDB-II software and data base for CENTCOM (replaced 11 January copy due to problems with updates).
6 February	DI-1 establishes Monday and Friday J2 briefs for senior OSD principals.
7 February	DC-1 keeps JCS/JRC informed of SNAPSHOT platform via verbal mission assessment briefing.
10 February	BDA footage begins to arrive daily from the Joint Camera Shop at the Pentagon. In-house distribution made for DB-6 and BDA Cells.

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- 12 February DIA forwards studies on breaching the Iraqi defensive barriers in southern Kuwait to CENTCOM.
- DIA establishes a formal C3 Cell in the DoDJIC with CIA participation in an effort to improve targeting of Iraqi C3.
- DAT-6 tasks regional assets to report the attitudes of their host countries concerning the US bombing of Iraq.
- 13 February DIA BDA analysts determine that Iraq is dispersing aircraft to historical sites to reduce likelihood of destruction by air attacks.
- 14 February DIA establishes Multispectral Imagery Fusion Cell to support the Scud Cell in the DoDJIC.
- 15 February DC-1 responds to JS tasker with information brief on various imagery platforms.
- 19 February DAT-6 tasks worldwide collectors to provide information on any Iraqi terrorist action against the Coalition forces.
- DS produces IDB II data base for CENTCOM to replace corrupted 23 January version.



Historical monuments, like the ancient temple depicted in this DIA Public Affairs drawing, were not targeted despite the placement of military equipment nearby.

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- 20 February DC-1 reports on airborne reconnaissance surge capability for the ground war.
- 21 February DIA ground forces assessment production begins.
- DIA moves MSS production ■ NMIC.
- DIA Document Exploitation (DOCEX) personnel depart for Saudi Arabia.
- 22 February DAT-6 tasks assets in Western Europe, Middle East, Far East, and the Soviet Union, requesting their views and national interests in the Iraqi post-war period.
- 24 February Operation DESERT SABRE (G-Day), the Coalition ground campaign begins.
- DIA begins production ■ two MSSs per day.
- February DIA Director curtails MIB meetings to biweekly.
- DIA sends a reserve augmentee who ■ a trained interrogator and Arab linguist to Turkey to assist the Turkish Government in debriefing Iraqi military defectors.



Destroyed Iraqi armored vehicles.



Burning oil wells in Kuwait.

27 February DOCEX team deploys to Kuwait.

28 February Coalition forces/Iraqi cease-fire.

At cessation of hostilities, ITF consists of 634 personnel, with 394 working in the Pentagon and 240 working in the OICC at the DIAC. ■ the 394 ■ the Pentagon, 42 work in the ITF headquarters, 277 in the DoD/MC, 40 in the BDA Cell, 17 ■ the C3 Cell, and ■ in general support.

DIA sends out last Scud Cell report.

DIA sends out last daily BDA report.

DIA cancels twice daily MSS.

NMIST deploys to SOCCENT Forward, Kuwait City.

2 March USDAO London debriefs a recently released CBS crew after its return from Iraq. Information from the CBS crew confirmed the identification of some of the US and UK POWs still in Iraq.

3 March Iraq accepts cease-fire terms at Safwan Airfield.

POSTWAR

3 March DIA sends out final DIMS report.

DC-1 develops input for a CJCS congressional testimony. The subject area involves which reconnaissance assets in the KTO can provide I&W for movement of Iraqi armor.

3-17 March DIA and the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) deploy a Weapons Effectiveness Team to the KTO.

4 March DIA disbands OICC imagery representation.

5 March After-Action Report Team begins consolidating data.

6 March CENTCOM JRC forwards plans to DC-1 for a new postwar reconnaissance program.

7 March DA requests a plan for demobilization of the assigned reserve personnel who were recalled in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. A release date is also requested.

8 March DIA starts compilation of master BDA.

10 March DIA sends out last daily MSS.

DIA begins compilation of lessons learned.

11 March OICC resumes responsibility for the MSS message for ground and air updates.

13 March VP limits analytical briefings to weekly.

14 March	DIA disseminates last BDA message.
15 March	<p>DI-4 ceases DESERT STORM INTSUMs for attaches in Washington, DC.</p> <p>DIA releases master BDA.</p> <p>DIA monitors areas of unrest in Iraq and events in Baghdad.</p>
17 March	OICC reduces staff to extended hours (16-hour coverage).
22 March	<p>DIA releases first DESERT STORM reservists from active duty.</p> <p>DIA produces final glossy BDA publication.</p>
25 March	<p>JIPC in Riyadh terminates operations.</p> <p>CS tasks DIA directorates to provide historical information on support to DESERT SHIELD/STORM.</p>
March	VP publishes <i>Middle East: Postcrisis Issues</i> , focusing on the Iraqi military, political developments, and postwar reconstruction.
7 April	<p>Iraq accepts UN cease-fire conditions and resolutions.</p> <p>Operation PROVIDE COMFORT begins.</p>
18 April	To date, the ITF reports the receipt of 5,212 taskings. Of these, OICC responded to 3,822, or 73 percent of the total.
April	DX publishes, <i>DESERT STORM BDA Imagery Review</i> , a four volume reference guide for intelligence analysts and DoD officials.
10 May	DIA disestablishes ITF.



Kurdish Tent City
in northern Iraq.

18 June DCEX team redeploys from Saudi Arabia to the US.

22 July General Colin Powell presents DIA with a Joint Meritorious Unit Award for exemplary performance during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

■ August Director of Central Intelligence presents DIA with the National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Award.



Victory parade in Washington, D.C.
in May 1991.



The Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) is the area south of 31 degrees latitude within the borders of Iraq and Kuwait.

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The DIA line chart is included to give the reader an idea of how DIA was organized in 1980-91. Since DIA has been reorganized or realigned twice since 1990, the organization and office symbols have changed significantly.

DIA ORGANIZATIONS	
Office Symbol	Organization
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DR	Director
DD	Deputy Director
ED	Executive Director
SC	Secretariat
TG	Inspector General
DIO	Defense Intelligence Officer
GC	General Counsel
OSC	Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence
OSC-2	Physical/Tempest Security Division
OSC-5	Security Programs Division
DIC	Defense Intelligence College
OC	Comptroller
D/GDIP	General Defense Intelligence Program Staff
CS	Directorate for Command Support and Plans
CS-R	Command Representatives
CS-CR	Intelligence Communications Architecture Project Office
VP	Directorate for Foreign Intelligence
DE	Directorate for Estimates
DS	Directorate for Research
DB-5	Global Analysis Division
OICC	Operational Intelligence Crisis Center
DB-6	Target Intelligence Division
DB-8	Middle East/Africa Division
DT	Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence
JS	Directorate for JCS Support
JSJ	Directorate for JCS Intelligence Support
JSI	Directorate for Current Intelligence
JSI-6A	NMIC Alert Center Operations
JSW	Directorate for Indications and Warning
JSS	Directorate for Systems Support
DI	Directorate for External Relations
DI-1	Director's Staff Group Division
DI-3	Legislative Affairs Division
DI-4	Foreign Liaison Division
DI-6	Foreign Exchanges and Disclosures Division
DI-PA	Public Affairs Office

DIA ORGANIZATIONS (Continued)

Office Symbol	Organization
DI-NFIB	National Foreign Intelligence Board
RS	Directorate for Resources
RTS	Directorate for Technical Services and Support
RSQ	Directorate for Procurement
RSR	Directorate for Human Resources
ROD	Directorate for Training
RLE	Directorate for Logistics and Engineering Services
DS	Directorate for Information Systems
DSD	Directorate for Systems Development
DSD-3	General Military Intelligence Support Division
DSM	Directorate for Programs and Policies
DSE	Directorate for Architecture and Engineering
DSI	Directorate for Internal Systems
DSP	Directorate for Processing and Production Services
DSO	Directorate for Systems Operations
DA	Directorate for Attaches and Operations
DAH	Directorate for Operations
DAT	Directorate for Attaches
DAT-6	Middle East/Africa Division
CA	Directorate for Collection and Imagery Systems
DX	Directorate for Imagery Exploitation
DX-5	Regional Analysis Division
DX-6	Current Imagery Division
DX-7	Systems, Technology, and Resources Division
DC	Directorate for Collection
DC-1	Current Operations Division
DM	Directorate for Imagery Management
DM-1	Plans, Programs, and Policy Division
DN	Directorate for National Systems
NOTE: The only DIA organizations mentioned are those involved in support of DESERT SHIELD/STORM.	

GLOSSARY

AIF	Automated Installation Intelligence File
AIRES	Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System
AOB	Air Order of Battle
ARCENT	Army Component, Central Command
ASARS	Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System
ATF	Automation Task Force
ATO	Air Tasking Order
BDA	Battle Damage Assessments
BTG	Basic Target Graphics
BW	Biological Warfare
C3	Command, Control, and Communications
CCF	Collection Coordination Facility
CHECKMATE	Air campaign planning group
CENTAF	Air Force Component, Central Command
CENTCOM	Central Command
CINCCENT	Commander in Chief, Central Command
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPS	Collection Posture Statements
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CTC	Central Tasking Cell
CTU	Commander Task Unit
CW	Chemical Warfare
DATT	Defense Attache
DCS	Defense Courier Service
DIAC	Defense Intelligence Analysis Center
DIC	Defense Intelligence College
DID	Defense Intelligence Digest
DIM	Defense Intelligence Memorandum
DIO	Defense Intelligence Officer
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DOCEX	Document Exploitation
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDJIC	DoD Joint Intelligence Center
DODIIS	DoD Intelligence Information System
DSA	Defense Special Assessment
DSNET3	Defense Integrated Secure Network 3 — TS/SCI level

GLOSSARY

E&E	Escape and Evasion
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EUCOM	European Command
FORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
FROG	Free Rocket Over Ground
FSTC	Foreign Science and Technology Center
GMI	General Military Intelligence
GOB	Ground Order of Battle
GREEN	Friendly forces
GRG	Gridded Reference Graphics
HET	Heavy Equipment Transport
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
I&W	Indications and Warning
IDB	Integrated Data Base
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
IR	Infrared
ITF	Iraqi Regional Intelligence Task Force
IZKUWG	Iraq/Kuwait Regional Working Group
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JIPC	Joint Imagery Processing Center
JRC	Joint Reconnaissance Center
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance System
KTO	Kuwaiti Theater of Operations
LAN	Local Area Network
MARCENT	Marine Corps Component, Central Command
MIB	Military Intelligence Board
MIDS	Military Intelligence Detachments
MINX	Multimedia Information Network Exchange
MISC	Missile and Space Intelligence Center
MSS	Military Situation Summary
MTI	Moving Target Indicator
NAVCENT	US Navy Component, Central Command
NDP	National Disclosure Policy
NIO	National Intelligence Officer
NMIC	National Military Intelligence Center

GLOSSARY

NMIST	National Military Intelligence Support Team
NOB	Naval Order of Battle
MNF	Multinational Force
OB	Order of Battle
OICC	Operational Intelligence Crisis Center
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSP	Operational Support Package
PGWG	Persian Gulf Working Group
RGFC	Republican Guard Forces Command
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SCUD	Soviet-made surface-to-surface missile
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOCENT	Special Operations Command, Central Command
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SRBM	Short Range Ballistic Missile
SSSI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
TAC	US Tactical Air Command
TARPS	Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System
TEL	Transporter-Erector-Launcher
TELNET	Telecommunications Network
TM	Target Material
TSCR	Time Sensitive Collection Requirement
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
USAOG	US Army Operational Group
USDAO	US Defense Attache Office
WATCHCON	Watch Condition
WWIMS	Worldwide Warning and Indicator Monitoring System

